













SO: = Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 
PM: = Sir Peter Marshall (Respondent) 
 
SO: This is Sue Onslow talking to Sir Peter Marshall on Monday, 18th 
November 2013. Sir Peter, thank you very much indeed for agreeing to 
take part in this oral history project. I wonder if we could discuss today 
your view of the Commonwealth and international economic diplomacy, 
beginning with the New International Economic Order. You’ve referred 
to Sir ‘Sonny’ Ramphal’s appointment as Secretary General in 1975. 
This was at the point of gathering interest and momentum in the New 
International Economic Order, after the Algiers Summit. You yourself 
were at the United Nations at this time. Did the Commonwealth feature 
on your radar, and in your range of activities at this particular point? 
 
PM: The answer to that question, I suppose, is not really in any formal sense. To 
be absolutely accurate, the first Special Sessions of the General Assembly 
which led to the proclamation of the New International Economic Order was in 
the spring of 1974. At that time, I was the Economic Under Secretary in the 
Foreign Office. Therefore, I was concerned with the NIEO debates at the 
London end and also the question of how much one went in for advanced 
preparation among the developed countries. The second Special Sessions of 
the General Assembly also on this subject didn’t occur until the late 
summer/early autumn of 1975 by which time Sonny was in situ. The individual 
delegations of the Commonwealth countries were very much prominent in the 
discussion in New York, particularly Britain, Canada, Australia, India, Jamaica 
and other Caribbean countries. New Zealand, although they only had a small 
delegation, provided an extremely useful guide to what was going on in the 
UN. It was a really publicly spirited effort. But there was no really prominent 
New Zealander on economic matters. It was not a case that Australia and 
New Zealand took a different stance because their political economies were 
more closely affiliated with the Pacific region. At one time New Zealand was 
part of what was regarded as the Group of 77 because it was small. 
Eventually, Australia and New Zealand became part of what is known in 
UNCTAD language as Group B, the ‘WEOG’ countries - the Western 
European and Other Group. The ACP countries, Asia, Pacific and Caribbean 
were regarded as developing countries, while Australia and New Zealand 
were seen as developed countries. 
 
 Now, although we knew one another very well and we’d have the discussions 
outside the forum; in the formal meetings themselves, of course, it was a 
question of the Group of 77 versus Group A - with Group D, the Soviet-bloc, 
being absolutely irrelevant to the issue, but doing their best to be successful 
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jackals or hyenas getting something out of it. The Soviet-led bloc just joined in 
denouncing imperialism. Now, once I became the minister in the UK 
delegation to the UN, in charge of all of this side of the house, in the autumn 
of 1975, for the next four years I had a marvellous opportunity of talking to my 
fellow Commonwealth delegates. Without going into the question of a formal 
Commonwealth movement or a meeting, we never acted as a bloc because 
we were in negotiating terms on different sides. That didn’t mean one couldn’t 
talk very much as friends and as people who had a common approach to a lot 
of the problems. What I did personally was switch the debate from the New 
International Economic Order which was setting government against 
government, to an International Development Strategy [See Sir Peter 
Marshall. ‘The North South Dialogue. Britain at Odds’, in Eric Jensen & 
Thomas Fisher (ed) The United Kingdom – The United Nations (Macmillan, 
1990]. I did this to prevent others setting the agenda; the right way to deal 
with international organisations is to set the agenda yourself. The OECD was 
a factor; I used the EEC. But the idea was to get Group B mobilised around 
thinking in terms of a strategy, rather than the NIEO. Eventually this is what 
happened, and the NIEO disappeared from the scene. Once the Cold War 
was over, there were agreed statements at the summits in 1995 – the 50th 
anniversary of the UNO, the Millennium Declaration and then the 2005 60th 
anniversary. 
 
 With the IDS (International Development Strategy), there was no thought of a 
fundamental restructuring of the international economic or financial system. It 
was more getting people to agree what could be done to better the lot of the 
ordinary individual. Structural adjustment and conditionalities were the 
function of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. That didn’t 
come into it, really. It was extraordinary how far the Bank and the Fund 
contrived to keep their discussions to themselves, and not to get involved in 
New York (discussions and debates) more than they had to; and not to let the 
politicians in New York come down and interfere in Washington. One of the 
great advantages of my being in the Secretariat was I could get into both; I 
had observer status with the Joint Development Committee in Washington, 
and of course the Secretariat had observer status at the General Assembly in 
New York. I was not hampered by the wall that treasury officials and ministers 
of finance liked to build up between what they did in Washington and what 
had been done in New York. 
 
SO: Was the 1981 Berg Report then running ideologically counter to the 
debates on NIEO in New York?  
 
PM:  Yes, it did. It originated with the World Bank. It was a Bank initiative. I think it 
is quite true. The IDS really did straddle what was going on in Washington 
and what was going on in New York. The man who helped this was Sonny, 
because he was a member of the Brandt Commission. At the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, we therefore had a chance (to influence debate). The Brandt 
Commission ended up as a world summit, the World Economic Summit in 
Cancun. Once you get heads of government involved, you are going to 
straddle everything. In New York it is predominantly Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs - except in the cases where heads of government came to address the 
General Assembly and then skid-addled - whereas the treasury and 
development ministries focussed on Washington. One of the great 
achievements of the Brandt Commission was that it straddled the two. It 
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comprised experts on economic affairs, and foreign affairs; and Sonny was 
very much a member of both groups. 
 
SO:  Your comments suggest that there was enormous intellectual interest in 
and energy directed towards the NIEO; but then there was a critical 
point at the end of the ‘70s and the beginning of the ‘80s, typified by the 
Cancun World Economic Summit, which saw the publication of the Berg 
report, and initiation of the structural adjustment era. Developing 
countries had become increasingly indebted in the 1970s, and 
confronted by rising energy costs, inflation and stagnating growth 
rates. The prescription from the IMF and the World Bank were 
STAB/SAPs - stabilisation loans and structural adjustment, with the 
conditionalities of tariff reduction, deregulation, flexible exchange rates, 
liberalization of economies, and contraction of the public sector 
employment. Was this part of the great discussion? 
 
PM: Absolutely. This is where the word ’governments’ comes in. Sonny and the 
former Swedish prime minister, Ingmar Carlsson, were on the 1987 
independent commission. We started to use the term ‘governance’, rather 
than ‘government’. The Brundtland Commission (report) was entitled ‘Our 
Common Future’; and then the Carlson-Ramphal Commission was ‘Our 
Global Neighbourhood’. The origin of it all was the Pearson Commission’s 
‘Finance For Development’ in 1968. The definition of ‘governance’ in the 
Carlsson-Ramphal Commission is: 
  ‘The design of governance is the sum of the many ways in which 
 individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common 
 affairs in good formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce 
 compliance that people have agreed, obviously, to have been in their 
 interest.’ This is the beginning of networking. 
 
 The question is how do you slide from inter-governmental economic 
negotiations to the sort of global engrenage which is set out in the 2005 World 
Summit Conclusions.  
 
SO: How did the Commonwealth fit into this shift towards globalisation? 
 
PM: Well, the answer is of course, well, with Sonny’s participation out of these 
commissions, but also if you look at the reports of Charles Gunawardena, and 
indeed the communiqués that we wrote, we had this wonderful 
Commonwealth government and the Commonwealth group on climate 
change and sea level rise which we agreed that in ’87 meeting in Vancouver, 
with that strange man from the Maldives – President Gayoom. Anyway, I think 
it’s probably in here. I think that maybe the man who understands most of this 
is Richard Jolly. Do you know him? 
 
SO: I know of him. 
 
PM: Tell him, you want to come and see him; again, take my name in vain, but he 
wrote or organised a marvellous book on the history of UN ideas. You see, a 
lot of all this thinking came out of the UN. People of that sort, such as Barbara 




SO: Was the Commonwealth - I can’t say ‘a nursery school’ because that 
implies something derogatory – an intellectual forcing shop, or think 
tank for these ideas which then gained credibility and traction in a wider 
UN context?  I’m just trying to situate the Commonwealth and individual 
people in the realm of economic and developmental ideas. 
 
PM: No, I don’t think so. People probably wouldn’t associate it with the 
Commonwealth as an entity. They knew that so many things emerge from the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: From the Secretariat, but also from individual Commonwealth 
countries? 
 
PM: That’s right. You see, this is where the networking comes in. The 
Commonwealth never operates or only very rarely operated as a bloc in the 
UN. 
 
SO: It didn’t operate as a bloc in GATT either. 
 
PM: No, that’s right. On the other hand, because we’d like to do these things 
around the edges, what goes on in the formal proceedings in any organisation 
matters less than what is going on in the outside. 
 
SO: Peripheral diplomacy, yes. 
 
PM: Once you’re in somewhere and you can do something about it. That’s why the 
French are right to say ‘Les absents ont toujours tort.’ I don’t know what 
Cameron will have done at the Sri Lanka CHOGM, or how much of a dent 
he’s made on Rajapaksa. 
 
 SO: Sonny Ramphal’s comment at the ‘Ghosts of CHOGMs Past’ meeting at 
the Institute of Commonwealth Studies last week, was ‘An empty chair 
doesn’t say anything.’ 
 
PM: That’s right. That’s quite right. 
 
SO Sir Peter, you were the first British diplomat to occupy a serious niche 
in the Secretariat. (I understand that a top British civil servant was 
briefly a DSG, but quit after a few months.) Please could I ask you about 
the Commonwealth and HIPC: the issue of Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries, and debt relief. You’ve commented elsewhere that Nigel 
Lawson as the British Chancellor had floated the idea of debt relief on 
heavily indebted poor countries in the 1980s when he was Chancellor, at 
a Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting. 
 
PM: That’s right. The Secretariat invented some software for debt management. 
This is on a technical assistance level. We had this group on debt relief and 
under the eccentric chairmanship of Harold Lever, described as the best 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Labour never had. He had this great duplex in 
Eaton Square; it was full of Fabergé eggs and things. He was a wonderful 
man, but a nightmare to work with! We did a great deal of work on the whole 
debt question, including the management of debt to help small, vulnerable 




SO: This group was the initiator? 
 
PM: This was all done by the technical experts in the Commonwealth Secretariat. 
 
SO: How did you attract the IMF’s interest? 
 
PM: Well, we took it to them. Obviously, not only ‘we’ but the beneficiaries, as it 
were; but certainly it aroused a great deal of interest. Frankly, I cannot 
remember exactly the mechanics, but, as they say in diplomacy, ‘we did not 
fail to bring this to the attention of the IMF.’ 
 
SO: Sir Peter, by the mid-1980s, economic problems and issues for 
developing countries were still very much part of the international 
debate; this was also when the Soviet model started to falter, with 
sluggish growth in the USSR and growing problems in Eastern 
European economies. 
 
PM: While the New International Economic Order was holding the fort, the whole 
question of oil - and most of the difficulties were arising from the cost of oil - it 
was obvious that you were not going to solve the real problems by inter-
governmental economic negotiation. The real problem was raising the living 
standards of people worldwide, and there was already in existence, 
something called the International Development Strategy. You’ll find it all in 
here, the IDS. I took the lead on this. I persuaded the EEC that we should 
submit a paper saying that the most important thing to do was to concentrate 
on the International Development Strategy as a whole, as distinct from inter-
governmental economic negotiations, because it was already clear that social 
questions were being neglected and at the end of the day they were more 
important than economic negotiation. 
 
 Now, I can’t remember exactly how this worked but this was towards 1979. In 
UN terms, here was a concentration on the IDS, the International 
Development Strategy, as distinct from the NIEO. At the same time, under the 
auspices of the World Bank, the Brandt Commission on North-South had 
started, with the same very wide coverage. One of the great 
recommendations it made was that there should be the first ever world 
summit on all these problems (The World Economic Summit) which in fact 
took place in Cancun in October 1981 with Reagan there and Mrs. T, 
amongst others. Now, at that meeting which represented in effect the last 
occasion on which the Group of 77 had a series of economic demands on the 
developed countries. They put forward, again, I cannot remember exactly 
what happened but I think they eventually got down to the four main points. 
Reagan and Mrs. T and others were prepared to wear two of them, but not 
the other two. 
 
 Now, the Group of 77 was stupid enough to say, “No, it’s got to be all four”. 
Whereas if they’d taken the two, they would have registered a very 
considerable success. But they were so used to saying, ‘We want it all, and 
we want it our way’, without really understanding the significance of what they 
were doing. There was no particular Commonwealth developing country 
within the Group of 77 taking a lead on this. I don’t remember who the 
principal operating countries were on behalf of the G-77 at Cancun: mainly 
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Mexico. The trouble was relations between the Unites States and Latin 
America were always much more confrontational than relations between 
Britain and the developing countries of the Commonwealth. I suppose it’s not 
least because of the division of language. 
 
 After that, the heat went out of the NIEO as such and there came much more 
concentration on the whole problem of development and development 
cooperation. There were then these series of mega-UN conferences on all 
sorts of social issues, water, population, the role of women, and of course the 
environment. That went on to the ‘80s and ‘90s. You then get into ’95 and 
2000 and 2005, declarations from the UN which were only made possible at 
the end of the Cold War. Before this, the UN was so polarized by the Cold 
War, this was not possible. Now it was possible, covering these very wide 
agendas. You may remember at the Commonwealth Secretariat Witness 
Seminar, I circulated the Heads of Agreement on items agreed in the 2005 
declaration. 
 
 That shows just how wide a degree of consensus there was on what the 
world’s problems were, and that shows that the NIEO was dead and buried. 
What you’re really talking about now is the world agreement on a large 
number of problems and what’s got to be done about them. 
 
 SO: What were your own views about conditionalities and structural 
adjustment?  
 
PM:  The simple answer is the Bank is really a fund, and the Fund is really a bank. 
By that I mean, if you are giving money out for development, you have to 
have some rules and quid pro quo to justify giving money, especially at 
concessional rates. There is no such thing as money without strings. The 
trouble was the conditionality with the IMF was all too often devaluation. 
 
SO:  I also put this question to Indrajit Coomaraswamy, as a former Governor 
of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, and then at the Commonwealth 
Secretariat. I asked him if there was a Commonwealth Secretariat in-
house view of structural adjustment. His response was, ‘We took the 
view, Sue, that yes, it was fine in principle but it should have been 
implemented with more of a human face.’ 
  
PM:  I think that’s right. There is exactly the same problem in the EU now, with the 
mendicant countries. It is very difficult: how to balance out the desire to help 
people, and ‘moral hazard’, and at the same time not let anyone get the idea 
that there is any money going for free. 
 
I used to say to everybody who would listen, the United Nations is three 
communities. It is a political community in a sense that you are dealing with 
legitimate differences between one sovereign country and another. It is also a 
community of management as to what it does collectively through its various 
programmes. It’s also a community of reflection because there’s a great deal 
of common thinking going on, in which delegations and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat can take part unofficially or indeed outside the ambit of the UN.  
There were organisations like The Stanley Foundation and various others 
which encouraged the informal discussion of UN problems in private or 
informal circumstances. I have great respect for The Stanley Foundation and I 
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think it’s still going strong. In other words, when you are talking about how the 
New International Economic Order, as adopted in General Assembly 
resolutions, is going to work out in practice? The answer is it works out in 
practice according to how the delegations cooperate with one another. 
 
Now, at the same time Sonny’s great contribution was that here was a 
Secretary-General who understood the nature of the North-South dialogue, 
and in his capacity as Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, could bring 
together people from both sides of the discussion and look at the problems 
dispassionately and more constructively. As you know, during his time, there 
was a very large number of expert groups on economic issues brought 
together in that book edited by Charles Gunawardena (International 
Economic Issues: contributions by the Commonwealth 1975-1990 The 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1990). No other international organisation has 
produced anything of that quality and indeed the Commonwealth Secretariat 
has not produced anything itself of this sort since then. What particularly 
attracted me to coming into the Commonwealth Secretariat rather indirectly 
was that when at the CHOGM meeting in Melbourne in 1981, the 
Commonwealth agreed to set up a working group on obstacles for the North-
South dialogue. I immediately wrote to Sonny saying, “What a good idea this 
is, and if I can do anything to help, well, let me know,” History will relate that 
he took that as a signal that he wouldn’t at all mind having me in the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. But, in fact, I was nominated by the British 
government who saw the light. The British had never had a senior post to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat before my time. Some names had been put 
forward before, but in those days you had to be elected, and British nominees 
were not popular. Furthermore, the whole area of dealing with the Third World 
was unfashionable, so no one had specialised in this; therefore the number of 
people able and willing to do it, could be counted on the fingers of one hand. 
I, on the other hand, was an expert (See also See Sir Peter Marshall 
submission to The Think Tank Report on the Role of the Foreign Office, FCO 
White Paper, 1978). 
 
SO: In that you were a remarkable diplomat as you were able to straddle the 
political worlds of New York, and the economic discussions in 
Washington, were you in any way involved in trying to moderate those 
who believed themselves to be ‘armed with hammers’? 
 
PM: We did it not directly, except I used to shuttle between the two and talk to 
delegations both in Washington and New York. But also we really did it 
through the whole series of reports at the Commonwealth Secretariat and 
that’s where it began. Where Heads of the Commonwealth and ministries and 
ministers of finance meetings – what we said was applicable both at 
Washington and in New York. The whole idea was in focus. Because all the 
heads of government declarations were from heads of government, and 
therefore they were relevant in terms of New York. But also, as far as 
economics was concerned – and a lot of it was economic – especially in the 
Joint Development Committee, which was a committee of the IMF, and the 
World Bank combined on development; and the EEC and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat had observer status at these meetings. I didn’t open my mouth as 
it was much better to listen to what they were saying: Nigel Lawson holding 




SO: Were you ever involved in government-to-Bank negotiations, providing 
guidance for, say, the Kenyan government or the Zambian government 
when they had to go ‘cap in hand’ to the Fund or the Bank? 
 
PM:  No. What I did do was organise a seminar on how to borrow money from the 
IMF. And I got along someone from the IMF who was very helpful and his 
advice was, ‘Come to us early.’ In other words, don’t wait until you have to. 
Another dear man, Sir Geoffrey Littler from the British Treasury. When Britain 
borrowed a huge amount of money from the IMF in 1976. We gave potential 
IMF borrowers on that occasion advice. That is what the Commonwealth 
Secretariat could do. The UN or the EEC could not do this in a hundred years. 
It was the informality of (the Commonwealth’s way of working). 
 
SO: Vishnu Persaud added a comment in his prepared brief (for the Witness 
Seminar on the Commonwealth Secretariat) that the Economic Affairs 
Division (EAD) also prepared economic briefs for the Non Aligned 
Movement. Does that square with any of your recollections? 
 
PM: No, but that wouldn’t surprise me. The common membership between the 
Non Aligned Movement and the developing country members of 
Commonwealth, especially India, was very close. So that wouldn’t surprise 
me in the least. ‘How very sensible of them!’ is all I can say. It was very good 
advice. Vishnu is a very sensible man. And when we had Vince Cable there 
too, it was an intellectual power house. People sat up and took notice of what 
the Commonwealth was saying in a way that they had never done before and 
have never done since. We were a very powerful team. 
 
SO: That ‘hard currency’ that you and I had discussed before. 
 
PM: I had started working in the Commonwealth Secretariat in the summer of ’83. 
At the Delhi CHOGM in 1983, in my job as a Deputy Secretary, we produced 
the draft of a declaration for adoption by the Commonwealth on how to 
increase cooperation between North and South. It’s called the New Delhi 
Statement on Economic Action (1983). It was issued as a separate text during 
the Delhi meeting. 
 
SO: Looking at documents which have just been released on the Margaret 
Thatcher Foundation website, which are briefing papers and notes that 
the prime minister made in the run-up to the New Delhi meeting: Sonny 
was obviously communicating with her, as he did with all heads of state, 
saying what the agenda was going to be and to discuss the presentation 
of the issues. In her letter of reply, Mrs. Thatcher says quite explicitly, 
‘There’s been a great deal of discussion about international economic 
issues in the first half of 1983. The reality of interdependence is now 
generally accepted. An enduring recovery of the world economy will do 
more than anything to alleviate the problems currently facing 
developing countries. We are at present started the report entitled, 
“Towards a new Bretton Woods,’” which you sent me on the 12th 
September and about which we spoke when you came to see me.’ She 
was also in touch with Robert Muldoon of New Zealand, and they were 
sharing their views of the importance of economic diplomacy and 
economic issues in international discourse. Both premiers were 




PM: Gerry Helleiner was the Canadian economist and I think he was the 
chairman. Look at the edited book by Charles Gunawardena, which brings 
together a group of about 12 expert reports which were produced during 
Sonny’s SG-ship. It is by far the best guide to the economic thinking of that 
time, the last quarter of the 20th century, that I have ever seen. 
  
 Mrs. T, when looking through the communiqué of the meeting of CHOGM, 
said on one occasion, “Haven’t you noticed how much better drafted the 
economic sections are than the political sections?” When I left, she said, “I 
want you to know how much I admire the work you did in the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, and that many of the heads of government have paid tribute to 
what you were doing.” It’s the genuine stuff.  
 
SO: Did you liaise at all with her office? 
 
PM: Oh yes. I was in and out of No. 10, seeing Charles Powell. Mrs Thatcher 
knew me because she’d come to stay with me in Geneva in ’82. She used to 
say to me, “How is all that boring work of yours?” You can just imagine at that 
time. 
 
SO: Looking at the material on The Thatcher Foundation website, there are 
draft speaking notes for the prime minister during the discussion on the 




SO: I just wondered if there was any collaboration between you and Charles 
Powell? 
 
PM: The answer is ‘of course.’ I knew far more about these issues of course than 
the economic side of the Foreign Office did. The other thing that’s very 
important is that Robert Armstrong, the Secretary of the Cabinet was present 
at that New Delhi meeting, as was Anthony Acland, the Permanent Under-
Secretary in the Foreign Office. With Anthony and Robert there, if there had 
been any real problem, we could have sorted it out. In fact, Sonny said, 
“Look, I’ve got a problem.” (This is 1983). “I come up for renewal in ’85 after 
10 years. Do you think Mrs. T wants me for a third term?” “I don’t know but I’ll 
find out.” She said immediately, “Of course, he must have a third term”. 
 
 On her relations with Ramphal, she didn’t want to be lectured to. But she 
knew that what we were doing at the Secretariat on the economic side was 
valuable; there was no doubt about that. She was also a committed 
Commonwealth leader, because she did go to six CHOGMs in all. So she 
was a real expert on them. She’s always very well prepared; always there at 
meetings promptly, when the others were late. 
 
SO: She took extensive notes, which survive in her private papers. 
 
PM: She was magnificently industrious, wasn’t she? 
 






SO: Very focused and committed, and ‘enjoyed a good argument’, I think is 
the phrase. 
 
PM: Oh, yes! I think she felt she was denied if there was no punch-up – that the 
meeting was somehow a failure! 
 
SO: Going back to your initial arrival at the Secretariat: as you’ve said, there 
was a Secretary-General who, by his own industry and initiative, gave a 
particular charisma and also profile to economic issues in a way that 
had not happened before. 
 
PM: And hasn’t happened since. 
 
SO: Was this a dramatic departure from the era of Arnold Smith? 
 
PM: That’s right. Arnold was more (of a diplomat and international civil servant), 
almost like a Kamalesh Sharma. Of course, Arnold Smith’s problem was 
setting the Secretariat up, and having these bloody minded British officials to 
deal with. There were some of them who were extremely disobliging. 
 
SO: Sir Peter, having devoted energy, commitment to intellectual discussion 
and to achieving a coherent drafting of declarations, how did you then 
start to put this into effect at New Delhi? Because there can be an 
attachment to process in the Commonwealth. 
 
PM: We gave it straight to the Indians as host. We said, “Here you are. This is 
what we suggest that you issue as a declaration.” After that, the delegations 
negotiated among themselves. I would take the chair. I think some of the 
Australians thought they’d rather deal direct with Indians. It would be quite 
clear what it was that we’re giving away, or not giving away, as the case may 
be… As it said in the text, ‘look, we know we don’t agree on everything, but 
the question is, “What can we do where there’s a maximum benefit to 
people?” What we’re after is doing the people of the Commonwealth a bit of 
good. 
 
SO: So it wasn’t simply in ensuring that you used your detailed experience 
in economic matters, and the relationship with British government and 
key British officials. How did you also use your connections at the 
United Nations? 
 
PM: The IMF/World Bank joint annual meetings would take place in Washington 
2/3. Every third year it was somewhere outside Washington, rotating by 
continent. In 1985 it was in Seoul, South Korea. In 1988, it was in Berlin.  
 I attended the joint annual World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
meetings. I also used to attend the interim committee and the development 
committee in Washington. The other thing was, in Washington, for the Bank 
and the Fund - it was treasuries and development people and they wanted to 
keep foreign ministries out of it. In New York it was foreign offices who kept 
the development people and the treasury out of it. I could span the two. It was 
magnificent. I used to go there at the beginning of the General Assembly; 
there’s this cloister at the side where the observers were. We were a select 
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group: Switzerland, the Holy See, the PLO and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat! 
 
 In 1983 I attended the Finance Ministers Meeting, immediately before the 
Bank Fund meeting in Washington. I then went on to New York and the first 
person that I called on in New York was the Indian ambassador to the UN, 
who was an old friend. I said, “Here is the communiqué from the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Meeting, because I don’t imagine you’ve 
got it from your people in Washington because he said, “Of course, we bloody 
well haven’t! I don’t know.” I could explain to them just what had happened in 
the Commonwealth Finance Minsters’ Meeting. By the time I got to Delhi, in 
other words, I had been in contact with a large number of Indian officials 
around the world. Of course, I knew them anyway. They were all friends or 
colleagues from New York and Geneva. 
 
SO: Did you provide other declarations or drafting material for, say, the 
development community of the World Bank? 
 
PM: No, no, we didn’t draft anything for the World Bank and the Fund. But on the 
other hand, the Development Committee would circulate a document from the 
Commonwealth Finance Committee communiqués. 
 
 Even Bank/Fund secretariat people didn’t do that. They were much more the 
servants of the thing. The Commonwealth Secretariat, with the Secretary-
General who had good offices and power, had a much more plenipotentiary 
role. This is nearer the role of the Secretary-General of the UN than the 
secretariats in Washington; but maybe that’s because of treasury and 
financial ethos. I wouldn’t have seen any possibility, as it were, of getting an 
oar in there. On the other hand, of course, they all recognise the expert 
quality of the reports coming out of the Secretariat. Now one of the things I 
organised was the seminar on how to borrow money from the IMF; and I got 
to take part of the people from the British Treasury. They were very good 
friends of mine who had themselves borrow enormous sums of money from 
the IMF. 
 
SO: In 1976. 
 
PM: That’s right. I also got - which is a great advance - somebody from the IMF 
Secretariat. His advice was, if you want to borrow money from the IMF, come 
early before you’re in real trouble. Because there tends to be a sort of almost 
an automatic recommendation of anybody with the difficulties was, of course, 
devalue.  There was a superb man called Carl Greenidge who was the 
Guyana Minister of Finance and he was fished out of being a professor in a 
university somewhere in the United States to go back to manage Guyana’s 
non-existent finances.  He said, “When you have a hammer in your hand, 
everything looks like a nail”.  That is the IMF prescription before when 
anybody in difficulties.  I said to him, “If you do not put that in your next 
speech, I’m going to put it in for you,” so he duly obliged. Splendid man, he 
was! 
 
SO: Sir Peter, what you’re describing here then is an extraordinary network 
of individual diplomats, treasury officials, academics, very much the 
world of the cognoscenti, contacting each other in the clearing houses 
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of London, New York and Washington.  Was this the main network of 
international economic diplomacy at this point? 
 
PM: Absolutely. I would say that it’s Washington, New York, London, Paris 
because of the OECD, Brussels and Geneva; there were six. The contact 
between them all is enormous. These issues chased themselves round the 
fora. As far as the EC was concerned, the only place outside Brussels where 
the Council, as distinct from the Commission, had offices was Geneva; and 
that’s the only place where they could hold ministerial meetings with the 
proper support of the EC, as it was then. 
 
SO: Does this mean that the very fact that the Secretariat was located 
London meant that it was part of this network, this world? 
 
PM: No. The reason is because I was part of the network and Sonny was. My 
predecessor and my successor? No way were they anything like as 
connected with all of this. I gave the Secretariat the openings to make these 
contracts which they wouldn’t have had otherwise. The Secretary-General is 
too busy with political issues to do it. I created a British niche in the 
Secretariat. I had three British successors but they simply hadn’t got the 
contacts or the chutzpah of getting to do the job, until that tapered away to the 
point when Veronica did it. SG Don McKinnon said, “I’m going to abolish your 
job.” Steven Cutts was there because he had come from OECD but I think 
he’s gone off to the UN now. He got none of the network of contacts inside 
Whitehall and around everywhere else. 
 
SO: Did Cold War ideologies intrude at all on this economic discourse & 
discussions - since the Cold War has been described as a ‘battle of 
systems and ideas’? 
 
PM: No, because the answer is we were really dealing with the principal economic 
variables of which nothing in the Soviet bloc mattered, except towards the 
end of the USSR, energy and the Soviet oil/gas pipeline. That did start to get 
complicated. But otherwise, on the whole, they were just irrelevant to debates 
and discussions, either among the developed countries or between the 
developing and developed countries.  
 
SO: Sir Peter, did you bring a particularly UN or a particularly Geneva way of 
structuring decision making? 
 
PM: The other thing is that in New York, there is the so-called Permanent 
Members Convention. This is the convention whereby the Permanent 
Members of the Security Council do not seek office than in any other of the 
UN bodies, which means, of course, they can’t run them. Now, the Permanent 
Members Convention does not apply in Geneva, as a result of which, I was 
able to take a hand in the organisation that went on in Geneva which no 
British ambassador could do in New York. I was chairman of the UNCTAD, 
Trade and Development Board. I was chairman of the UN High Commission 
for Refugees. We coordinated France; either Britain and France or Britain and 
the United States coordinated a number of Western positions. I also invented 
a dreadful group with a dreadful acronym (which I invented!) of ‘HULWOG’ - 
the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group – for which I got together all the 
people who give the aid in Geneva. So that we could liaise with one another 
13 
 
and not be picked off individually by predatory heads of agencies. There were 
five specialised agencies from Geneva, the ILO; the ITU; the World 
Meteorological Organisation; the World Health Organisation; the WIPO, the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation; and then things like GATT, all the 
humanitarian stuff, human rights. It was the humanitarian capital. In fact, now, 
these things are so political. Geneva is more important politically, in many 
respects than New York. I’ve lost count of the number of ambassadors I knew 
either in Geneva or New York who subsequently became foreign minister.  
Also, quite a number who had been foreign ministers or other ministers 
parked out and in other words ‘get rid of them’. The FCO were in fact totally 
incapable of understanding this. 
 
SO: Because their primary focus was on political diplomacy? 
 
PM: So oriented. I think the people didn’t understand and that went on anywhere 
else in the UN other than New York.  
 
SO: Now, so an excessive focus then on political diplomacy and in 
particular, venues for that then within a certain section of the Foreign 
Office, failing to appreciate the complexity of different aspects of 
diplomacy at this time then? 
 
PM: No, I don’t think they do; because you see, they equally made a certain mess 
on the economic side. The DFID became a separate department. They’ll 
never get it back in. The Foreign Office was asked by some parliamentary 
committee to produce a paper on the Brandt Committee. The paper they 
produced was so turgid that it got denounced by absolutely everybody. The 
Sunday Times, I think, or somebody who was not known for being a bleeding 
heart, said this is one of the shoddiest documents ever produced by the 
British government. Peter Carrington went personally to Robert Runcie to 
apologise for having gotten so wrong.  Well, the answer is, because the 
people on the economic side of the Foreign Office were useless. (One side on 
a bit of blue-crested paper would have given Sir Peter Carrington all he 
needed to know about it, but he didn’t get this.) If that’s what happened then, 
of course, how could anybody take the developing countries seriously. 
 
 I was in Geneva, again, and I had written to warn them that the British 
reputation on all of this was sinking rather low and that they really want to 
watch it. I wrote to another person at high level and the Foreign Office replied 
– shoot the messenger - they said, “Your message has gone down really 
badly. Geneva has no residence for ministers and, you know, we don’t think 
this, that and the other,” and Geneva doesn’t bother. And then, of course, 10 
days later, all this about the Brandt Commission blew up in their faces. But 
you don’t go around saying ‘I told you so’ to your colleagues if you want to get 
on with them! I think half got the message but not enough. 
 
SO: Sir Peter, during your time in ‘70s and the ‘80s, why was there such a 
purblind attitude towards the importance of economic diplomacy? Was 
it the complexity of the issues? 
 
PM: Because of an obsession with Europe is the answer. Remember, de Gaulle 
vetoed us twice in the 60s, and when he disappeared at the beginning of 
1969, a Labour government was still in power, but they said, ‘We’re going to 
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have another go’. It was when Heath came in in the summer of 1970, this was 
the absolute priority and focus. Nothing else in the FCO mattered. At the 
same time, what had been the separate Commonwealth Relations Office and 
the Foreign Office were merged in ’68, with all sorts of promises as to how the 
Commonwealth would be preserved and all that. Of course, it completely 
failed in practice. For the Foreign Office, when the Commonwealth went right 
below the radar... 
 
SO: When it lost a place in Cabinet? 
 
PM: ... everything was Europe, Europe, Europe. If you wanted career 
advancement, Europe was the way. Anything like economics and the Third 
World, that was sort of ‘also ran’. 
 
SO: It fell off the agenda as far as British civil servants and also British 
politicians were concerned?  So it was a question of calibre, focus, 
attention. Was there also a question of the complexity of economic 
diplomacy, and that it follows a different sine wave?  It isn’t necessarily 
tied into crisis and controversy.  It has a longer lead time, a greater 
degree of complexity, a different calendar of meetings? 
 
PM: Yes, you’re right. In my day, that is absolutely the case. They simply didn’t get 
it. You see, what happened was they thought, “Well, once they put that fellow 
Marshall in the Secretariat, it’ll be alright, and then we can carry on.”  In other 
words, they had an inter-department examination of Permanent Secretaries of 
what else they could do about the Commonwealth and didn’t come up with 
anything, nothing. ‘Except they’d got that fellow Marshall in the Secretariat, 
and he can get on with it.’ (I was fairly well known in Whitehall anyway at this 
time.) This was what was going on. I think today, if you talk to somebody like 
Simon Fraser, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the moment, by this time, 
they’d grasped it. I will tell you where I think the sign is they’d got it. In 
December 2003, Jack Straw was Foreign Secretary with Michael Jay as his 
PUS. Simon Fraser as a sort of the ‘thinking king’ issued a White Paper called 
Britain’s International Strategic Priorities or something like that. That I would 
say has got a wonderful grasp of Britain’s problems. The only trouble was that 
although the Foreign Office had got the message, Blair hadn’t and they still 
went bald-headed for Europe. They produced a successor also in Jack 
Straw’s time. Which is CM 6762 called Active Diplomacy for a Changing 
World. Now, there you got a real understanding of Britain’s position across 
the board. 
 
 As they say, it didn’t really make a dent on the entourage of Blair and Brown 
where sofa diplomacy was the order of the day. They became sort of 
management freaks. Ivor Roberts in writing his valedictory dispatch from 
Rome denounced all of this. I think the word ‘bullshit’ came in. I can’t 
remember exactly. Anyway, as a result of which the practice of writing 
valedictory dispatches was banned. I think you want to get it back in. 
 
SO: I think so too. 
 




SO: Sir Peter, just going back to your time at the Secretariat between ’83 and 
’88: you’ve said that this was an era of a very charismatic Secretary-
General who was particularly interested in, and had the intellectual 
grasp for big international economic issues affecting the developing 
world. He was assisted by key Commonwealth heads who themselves 
were particularly committed: Michael Manley of Jamaica, Indira Gandhi, 
but also the Canadians, the Australians and Britain there at the Delhi 
CHOGM. 
 
PM: Also, of course, the Tanzanian and Zambian prime ministers were... 
 
SO: Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda? 
 
PM: Nyerere was no administrator but he was a marvellous fellow and I rather 
took to Kenneth Kaunda too. The point was that they understood what the 
Commonwealth was about. Indira Gandhi was the hostess and that wonderful 
woman, Eugenia Charles, from Dominica, and Pierre Trudeau, sitting around 
on that table: there were some really good eggs. Sonny Ramphal said to me 
before, “You know, I think it’s going to be a rather boring meeting”. Then the 
Americans solved the problem by invading Grenada! Mrs T., in this wonderful 
story, rang up Reagan and blasted him. He had his advisors in the room and 
he held the phone out so that everyone else could hear and he said, “Isn’t she 
wonderful”. Of course, it was Gorbachev: “a man with whom we can do 
business.” You think how much good she did. 
 
SO: Without a doubt, particularly, although Commonwealth devotees don’t 
like to hear it, when she was talking to the South Africans. She found 
apartheid morally repugnant, but the Afrikaner leadership felt that she 
was a friend of South Africa, even though she didn’t support the 
National Party. She was consistent in saying, “You have to modify your 
constitution. You have to make steps and modify your abhorrent 
political system”. Former Foreign Minister Pik Botha was emphatic 
about her importance, as were other South Africans that I’ve 
interviewed. 
 
PM: Yes, it’s quite right. Mandela, when he came to London, realised (this). 
Whatever had been said in the Commonwealth and the disagreements in the 
Commonwealth, the first place he wanted to give a whole press conference 
was the Royal Commonwealth Society. The magnanimity of people like this is 
so wonderful. 
 
SO: It’s remarkable. 
 
PM: Isn’t it? You see, the Nehrus were the same. There was a lovely story about 
Nehru. His father Motilal was desperately anti-British but nonetheless he used 
to smoke State Express 777 cigarettes. Somebody said to him one day, “Now 
look here, Motilal, if you’re as anti-British and all that, why do you smoke 
State Express 777 cigarettes?” To which he replied, “Every time I come 
across something British, I burn it”. Isn’t that lovely? You could do business 
with people like this. 
 
SO: You can indeed.  Sir Peter, what are your recollections of the Nassau 




PM: Oh, the first thing was I persuaded my name sake, (British Airways Chairman) 
Colin Marshal to fly the heads of government there in Concorde. He put one 
special flight on. Of course, Pindling was in terrible trouble at home, because 
of allegations of his connections with international criminal and drug networks, 
but another example of what we did in Nassau was this was the 40th 
anniversary of the UN. There had been a committee in New York, the General 
Assembly, to prepare a declaration on the occasion of the 40th anniversary, 
and they had met for a whole year and couldn’t agree. I said to Sonny, “Look, 
why don’t we come to Nassau with a draft declaration of support for the UN, 
which the Commonwealth can agree on and which would reflect the opinions 
of the vast majority of the membership with the UN. We produced a draft 
which Sonny presented to the heads of government. They said, “This is 
marvellous. We’d like a little more economics in it. Let the foreign ministers 
have a look at it.” They put some more economics in it and then it was then 
issued straight away. That’s an example of operating in a way in which 
nobody but the Commonwealth could have done that. They wouldn’t have 
had the speed or the quickness of movement to do it you see. 
 
SO: Was it also because the Commonwealth wasn’t affected by the Cold War 
dimension? 
 
PM: Yes, exactly. It wasn’t affected immediately by Arab\Israel friction. One could 
finesse in the Commonwealth in a way in which wasn’t possible in the UN. 
You had to do these things by consensus because if there wasn’t like 
consensus there’s no point in it, but, it was an example. Sonny used to say, 
“We can’t negotiate on behalf of the UN but we can help the UN to negotiate.” 
 
SO: In the run-up to Nassau, had you already put together a draft for 
Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa? Because by 1985, this 
was when the pressure was starting to build up. 
 
PM: I used to deal on the economic side, and so that was on the political side. 
 
SO: I just wondered if EAD had any input in terms of drafting on sanctions. I 
know, Vishnu made reference to S. K. Rao drawing up guidelines on 
economic sanctions in his written summary for the project. 
 
PM: The other thing was that, of course, the South Africans obviously, felt they’d 
get to me: I was the soft underbelly at the Secretariat. That was really fairly 
clear that I was to have nothing, whatever, to do with South Africa. In fact, 
with the whole thing. 
 
SO: Why were you considered ‘the soft underbelly’ of the Secretariat? 
 
PM: Well, because of being the only Brit anywhere near the top of the Secretariat. 
Now, the South African ambassador, one or two people tried to get a hold on 
me. Especially, of course, during the 1986 London mini-summit. 
 
SO: How did this happen? I want to ask you very much about London, but 




PM:  He really was a very good South African diplomat. He studied at Ibadan 
University in Nigeria, and he was an all-African long-distance runner 
champion.  My deputy in Geneva knew him from some other diplomatic 
appointment. We had dinner together at Christopher Long’s house. 
 
SO: He was trying to lobby you quietly? 
 
PM: The answer was they thought if I was involved in the thing, I’d be easier to get 
at. Equally, Sonny was very clear that he didn’t want me involved and I much 
preferred not to be involved because I could keep the rest of the show on the 
road while everyone else was doing South Africa. 
 
SO: What was your take on the Nassau meeting in terms of the dynamic 
between the heads on the South African issue? 
 
PM: I think they basically agreed to disagree. I can’t remember, was this the one 
where Mrs. T did that? (gesture of small measurement). Well, that was a little 
bit naughty of her because I think they thought they had agreed on what the 
line was, you see, and she had agreed on that line and at the same time did 
this. I think she did the same thing in 1989, Kuala Lumpur. There was the 
rather brutish fellow, Bernard Ingham, her press secretary. A rough diamond.   
Charles Powell was the one I talked to. I never talk to Bernard Ingham very 
much. I don’t remember having done so. 
 
SO: After the Nassau meeting, the Eminent Persons Group was sent out to 
South Africa. Mrs. Thatcher was, in fact, very largely instrumental in 
making sure that they were accepted in the first place, through her 
bombardment of letters to President PW Botha. 
 
PM: She wanted Geoffrey Howe to be the British member of the group and Sonny 
said, “Look, you can’t have the Foreign Secretary or the others,” I had to go to 
a meeting in the FCO. I sorted this out and I said, “Okay, I’ll get Sonny back 
from Toronto or wherever he was, so that they can discuss and agree on it.”  
Eventually, the man who they put in the group was Tony Barber. They simply 
don’t know how to keep their feet dry. Denis Greenhill who was the 
Permanent Under-Secretary told me that Tony Barber felt put on a bit, but the 
answer is it’s good UN tactics. I met another man, a British diplomat and a 
saintly fellow, who was head of British Red Cross having had all sorts of 
diplomatic posts. He came to a meeting the international committee of the 
Red Cross movement as a whole. As chairman of the British Red Cross we 
came and had lunch with him. He explained all the skulduggery going on. 
Then he related it all to me, and then suddenly the penny dropped and he 
said, “I suppose all of this is familiar to you as daylight, isn’t it?” I said, yes. He 
then realised that he should have been thinking in rather a different 
dimension. He’s a splendid fellow. 
 
SO: Sir Peter, the EPG mission was aborted because the South African Air 
Forces bombed the three Commonwealth capitals of Lusaka, Harare and 
Gaborone at dawn on 19th May. After the EPG report had been written 






SO: You were intimately involved in the arrangements for that London mini-
CHOGM? 
 
PM: That’s right. It was a three-a-side, so the Commonwealth team was Sonny 
and Emeka and me. In 1986, the Commonwealth Games were also the 
subject of a wholesale boycott of the Africans. This is the only time in my life 
when media have really taken any interest in me. One morning, I had to go on 
some breakfast TV programme and I cannot remember what it was. Anyway, 
I went along there to explain what was going on. As I came out, into the green 
room, there was Robert Maxwell with one huge foot in plaster sitting up on a 
table, so I said, “I’m Sir Peter Marshall”. He said, “Yes, I know who you are 
and I’m going to go in there and say that Sonny isn’t doing anything to stop 
these Games from being boycotted.”  He allegedly was putting up some 
money to support the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh. If it was, it was 
out of his employees’ pension fund!  
 
 Anyway, so I said, “Just a minute,” I said, “To ask what Sonny is doing? 
That’s a perfectly reasonable thing to do, and as it happens he’s making a 
speech later on this morning and when I go from here” - this is the day before 
mobile telephones - “If you give me a telephone number, I’ll talk to him and I’ll 
ring you and tell you what he’s going to say.  In the meantime, surely, the 
right thing to do is to say, not that Sonny is doing nothing, but what is Sonny 
going to do,” and to his credit that’s what he did.  When I rang Maxwell up and 
I gave him all the spiel. He said, “You noted, didn’t you, that I followed your 
advice?”  I said, “Yes, I’m very grateful.”  He said, “I am much obliged to you.”  
Those were the last words I’ve ever heard him say.  Anyway, the atmosphere 
was really febrile and I remember some Scottish Sunday newspaper ringing 
me up and saying, “Would you mind telling me what the hell is going on down 
there?”  I said, “You’ve heard the phrase little Englander, haven’t you?  
You’ve never heard of the phrase, ‘Little Scotlander.’”  He had agreed with 
how he hadn’t. I said, “The thing is that a lot of people in this country just don’t 
want to know about the Commonwealth, and a lot of other people are coming 
here determined to get Britain to see the South African problems the same 
way they do and they won’t.” 
 
 For the London mini-summit, Mrs. T occupied my office and installed a hotline 
and stocked it with her favourite brand of whisky and I forget now what it was.  
Anyway, it only lasted a day I think. Perhaps it was two days, anyway. Then, I 
said to her, “Would you like to leave the hotline in my office?”  She said, 
“Certainly not, I might use it,” she said. [laugher] I don’t know why.  For the 
meeting itself, we got the Queen down from Balmoral to give the delegates a 
dinner early before the meeting started, to help cool the atmosphere down 
rather than during it.  One of the things I did, was I went out to meet Mugabe 
when he arrived at Gatwick with a letter from Sonny saying, “Keep your trap 
shut in advance of the meeting. The less anybody says about this meeting in 
advance the better.” 
 
That was the way we played it, and that is another absolutely fascinating 
point. Before the Games, Sonny rang me up on Saturday morning saying, 
“Look, Brian Mulroney has rang me saying he’s wondering if, with the support 
of Rajiv Gandhi and Bob Hawke, he approached Mrs. T in saying, ‘Can we all 
agree that we leave the whole thing in abeyance so that everybody can come 
to the Commonwealth Games and it won’t be boycotted?’” He said, “I’d be 
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quite willing to do that if I know in advance that I won’t have my head bitten 
off.”  Sonny said, “Well, what do you do about this?” I rang the duty clerk at 
Number 10.  He wasn’t a Foreign Office man but he was very sensible. We 
had as a form of words, and I said, “This is what they’re wondering about.”  
Now, do you think there’s any point in trying this on Mrs. T?”  He said, “Well, 
I’d ask her.”  She was sitting in the garden at Chequers. She said...and I think 
that you know.  She has the same form of words but if you have a lot 
of...there’s plenty of room to play around with. He said, ‘Well, her view is this; 
that the line they’re going to take at the meeting has been agreed in Cabinet 
and you just want to unscramble the whole thing.  She would better let it go 
as it is.” 
 
 I said to him, “Well, speaking personally, I think that’s exactly the right thing to 
do. I think it’s too late to try. We were discussing all of it. This had taken a 
period of several hours. Of course, it was Mulroney’s (idea) this time and 
Rajiv and Bob Hawke couldn’t have come into it because it was in the middle 
of the night where they were. Anyway, just as we thought the whole thing was 
put to bed, there broke this extraordinary story about the Queen and Mrs. T 
being absolutely at odds. Do you remember - Michael Shea? 
 
SO: I do remember indeed. 
 
PM: I said to Sonny, “Look, I think, what we’ve been talking about is going to be 
slightly overtaken by this.” [chuckles] There was, of course, the most colossal 
hoo-ha. Eventually, poor Michael Shea, was the fall guy; I didn’t know what 
he did but he clearly did step over the mark. He should have been 
experienced enough not to have done that, but anyway. It was the most 
extraordinary time - that I was sitting peacefully in the house in London and 
Sonny at home too, and this report [laugher]. Being shown to be completely 
overcome and overshadowed, media wise by this story that broke in The 
Sunday Times. 
 
 At the London meeting itself, at one stage it was down to two, so that I 
dropped out and the UK team was Mrs. T, Geoffrey Howe and Robert 
Armstrong. Robert and I dropped out. We had plenty of time talking about all 
this, because by this time, the disagreement between Mrs. T and Geoffrey 
Howe was open. She hadn’t got around, at the stage, to firing him, but, she 
had thought about giving him the dressing down in public. He was such a mild 
man. The other thing we did was we arranged the agenda so that Geoffrey 
Howe, who had made a separate visit to Southern Africa where he got bawled 
out in public by Kenneth Kaunda, spoke first. So, with the Queen giving a 
dinner beforehand – ie. very early on - then, the first item on the agenda was 
the report by Geoffrey Howe, that he would have his say. 
 
SO: So ‘the voice of reason’ could be heard? 
 
PM: That’s right. The organisation of the agenda is the most important part of 
these things. 
 
SO: Absolutely. After the meeting was over, what was your debrief with 




PM: The meeting broke up in disorder and then Rajiv said, “Well, the UK has just 
sacrificed the moral leadership of the Commonwealth,” to which the reply 
was, ‘Well, have we had it anyway?” My own impression on it was there was 
something slightly synthetic about the degree of disagreement. As the 
Caribbeans and other people said, “Why do we spend all this time on South 
Africa rather than real economic problems?” You see, there would be no 
Caribbean if Pindling hadn’t been in the chair. It was Pindling, Sonny, Hawke, 
Kaunda, Mugabe, Mulroney, Mrs. T, and Rajiv Gandhi. 
 
SO: Sir Peter, in your view as an economist, where was the Secretariat’s 
greatest strength? Was it under Sonny Ramphal’s leadership of the 
Secretariat, precisely because of its political diplomacy? Was it 
matched by the equally heavy weight economic diplomacy? 
 
PM: A good question. I’m not sure, paradoxically, that they are absolutely 
connected. In the sense that, Sonny’s validity in economic matters was of 
course, in the eyes of developing countries, was obviously validated by his 
known stance on South Africa. That didn’t make him all that popular, though, 
with the IMF and the World Bank, in which I had a somewhat soothing, 
emollient role. I can remember one of the IMF people saying in my presence, 
about something Sonny had said that it was ‘peu gentil’. On the other hand, 
there must be a certain interconnection between the two.  Although, and I 
think the weight certainly on the economic side was a function of expertise 
and commitment.  In Sonny’s case, a certain charisma and prestige. I have to 
say to you, the fact that I was very well know in the UN system, wasn’t exactly 
a hindrance to the situation. 
 
SO: Far from it! Because it gave the Secretariat ‘hard currency’. 
 
PM: Certainly, certainly. They knew we had a very good Economic Affairs Division, 
and I could represent them. The quality of the economic side of the office was 
superb. I don’t know what it’s like now and of course I feel inhibited from 
trying to find out. I was there at a particular juncture of international affairs; of 
the stand-off between North and the South, South Africa and the Cold War. 
Once you remove those three, you have a different ball game. 
 
SO: Sir Peter, in what ways do you feel that the Cold War affected or 
influenced the Commonwealth and its activities and the Secretariat? Or 
in fact did this paradigm of international relations really not impinge 
upon the Commonwealth’s area of activities? 
 
PM: Well, in one very practical way we organised a seminar on the experience the 
developing countries had in dealing with the Iron Curtain countries. 
Comparing the techniques adopted by the Iron Curtain countries in Asia, 
Africa and the Caribbean. Of course, it all came out, the tactics were the 
same, and the value they offered in exchange for the raw materials they were 
so anxious to get, was contemptible. In other words, as an exercise in 
opening the eyes of the developing countries, which is the fact that these 
chaps behind the Iron Curtain were not the cat’s whiskers - it had some value.  
They said okay, ‘the Commonwealth Secretariat understands what’s going 
on.’ Similarly, we had this office in Geneva while one of those innumerable 
rounds of trade negotiations are going on; the idea was to hold a watching 
brief for the countries which were not present. But it very soon came to be the 
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place to which those who were present came to see, find out what was going 
on. Then other people said, “Would you tell us what the situation was”, with 
which we also said, “Not unless you join the Commonwealth.” Now, what sort 
of impression that would have made on others, I don’t know, because you’re 
subject to a great many impressions if you work in the sort of higher pressure 
international. Geneva, of course, was full of various stimulating characters.  
You’ve got to know what you are talking about if you are going to make any 
dent on it. A very good number of people who held that post didn’t know what 
they were talking about and therefore made no dent. 
 
 A US official who was tasked with reform of the UNO came to ComSec (in the 
1980s).  His view was ‘You keep doing what you are doing. You are the only 
ones doing it.’ The US view was also that the Commonwealth was an English 
speaking non-aligned movement. 
 
SO: Sir Peter, thank you very much indeed for giving me so much time.  It 
has been a pleasure to talk to you. 
 
[END OF AUDIO RECORDING] 
 
